Ireland: The Way Forward

Some pseudo-left elements have suggested that the current hold-up in the peace process in Ireland shows that the recent strategy of Sinn Fein (of military cease-fire and concentration on political struggle) was 'a betrayal of the Irish people's struggle for national liberation'.

INTRODUCTION


On 10 April (Good Friday) 1998
"... the UK and Irish governments secured an historic Northern Ireland multi-party peace agreement ... as the two governments and eight political parties signed the agreement at Stormont Castle, Belfast".1


On 10 May 1998, a special Sinn Fein conference in Dublin
"... voted to take seats in a Northen Ireland assembly, thereby reversing the republican party's position, held over 70 years".2

On 22 May 1998,
"... Irish voters on both sides of the border gave their resounding support to the multi-party peace agreement. ... In simultaneous referendums, the first all-Ireland ballot since 1918, voters in ... Ireland approved the so-called Good Friday agreement".3
The 'yes' vote was 71.12% in Northern Ireland and 94.39% in the Republic. 4

On 25 June 1998, an election was held in Northern Ireland
" ... to elect the 108-member Assembly which had been established under the historic Good Friday agreement and endorsed in the May 22 referendum".5

The parties opposed to the Good Friday agreement

". . . failed to secure the 30 seats necessary to impede the work of the Assembly".6

On 1 July 1998, David Trimble, leader of the Ulster Unionist Party, was elected First Minister of the Northern Ireland National Assembly, and Seamus Mallon, of the Social Democratic and Labour Party, as his deputy. 7

On 16 February 1999,
" ... the Northern Ireland Assembly voted by 77 votes to 29 to approve the power-sharing executive and cross-border bodies. The Assembly ... also ratified plans for the north-south ministerial council, six cross-border bodies, a civic forum, and a British-Irish council"8

On 16 October 1998, John Hume, leader of the Social Democratic and Labour Party, and David Trimble, leader of the Ulster Unionist Party, were awarded the 1998 Nobel Peace Prize for"... their efforts to find a peaceful solution to the conflict in Northern Ireland".9

HOWEVER, ON 15 JULY 1999, THE ULSTER UNIONIST PARTY BOYCOTTED THE MEETING IN STORMONT TO ELECT ULSTER'S FIRST POWER-SHARING EXECUTIVE",10

its leader, David Trimble, declaring his party's
"... refusal to share power with Sinn Fein before the IRA disarms".11
The Democratic Unionist Party, led by Ian Paisley, did not boycott the meeting, but declared that
"... his party would not take its two seats on the executive because of the IRA's refusal to disarm".12

British Secretary for Northern Ireland, Mo Mowlam, immediately altered the terms of reference of the Committee to provide that
"... those appointed to office ... could only continue as ministers if the executive contained at least three Unionists and three nationalists".13

THE QUESTION OF IRA DISARMAMENT

The Ulster Unionist Party's pretext for boycotting the election of the executive was, as we have seen, 'the failure of the IRA to disarm', but, as Seamus Mallon pointed out when he resigned as Deputy First Minister on protest at the UUP's decision.
"The Unionists demand for prior decommissioning was 'a condition nowhere to be found in the agreement... They are dishonouring the agreement".14

Indeed, on the question of decommissioning, the agreement merely required the signatories
" ... to use any influence they may have to achieve the decommissioning of all paramilitary arms within two years"15
The question of whether or not, and if so when, the IRA should disarm is thus ultimately a question for the IRA to decide, and it has on many occasions
" ... made clear that it would not relinquish its weapons".16

It would indeed be the height of political naivety for the IRA to disarm while the Royal Ulster Constabulary remains a paramilitary force controlled by the Unionists. When the leader of the French Communist Party, Maurice Thorez, asked Stalin in November 1944 if the French Resistance should disarm, Stalin's reply could not have been clearer:
"It is necessary to transform the armed detachments into another organisation, a political organisation; as for weapons, it is necessary to hide them".17

A MISTAKEN STRATEGY?


Some pseudo-left elements -- people who claim to be on the left but are in reality on the right -- suggest that the current hold-up in the peace process in Ireland shows that the recent strategy of Sinn Fein (the strategy of military cease-fire and concentration on political struggle) was mistaken, was 'a betrayal of the Irish people's struggle for national liberation'.

BUT IN FACT, THE SITUATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND HAS QUALITATIVELY CHANGED SINCE IRELAND WAS PARTITIONED IN DECEMBER 1921 INTO THE NEO-COLONY OF THE (THEN) FREE STATE AND THE COLONY OF NORTHERN IRELAND.

Then, the British Empire was still in existence and British imperialism was a world power. Then, the colonial status of Northern Ireland could be maintained with acceptable stability by according preferential status to the Protestant community, who regarded themselves as loyal to Britain.

Today, the situation has radically changed and the British imperialists have had to accept the prospect of the transformation of Northern Ireland from directly ruled colony to indirectly ruled neo-colony and eventual fusion with the neo-colony in the south. This changed position is manifested not only in the Good Friday power-sharing agreement of last year, but in such things as the restrictions on the Orange marches.
This strategy has the backing of the government of the Republic and of the American imperialists.

SINN FEIN IS THUS CORRECT TO CHANGE ITS STRATEGY TO BRING IT INTO LINE WITH THE NEW REALITY.

The hold-up in the peace process is not because the Protestant minority in Ireland has the power to stop it. Indeed, the majority of the population in both North and South is firmly for it.

THE PRESENT DEADLOCK IN THE PEACE PROCESS CANNOT BE RESOLVED BY AMENDING THE GOOD FRIDAY AGREEMENT SO AS TO MAKE IT MORE ACCEPTABLE TO THE ULSTER UNIONISTS, FOR THAT WOULD BREACH THE AGREEMENT. IT CAN BE RESOLVED ONLY BY PRESSING THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO FULFIL THE TERMS OF THE GOOD FRIDAY AGREEMENT, BY MAKING IT CLEAR TO THE ULSTER UNIONISTS THAT THEY HAVE NO VETO OVER THE PROGRESS OF THE PEACE PROCESS, AND THAT IF SOME OF THEIR LEADERS CONTINUE TO STAND ASIDE, THE PROCESS MUST GO FORWARD WITHOUT THEM.


REFERENCES
1. 'Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 44; p.42,206.
2, 3, 4 . 'Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 44; p.42,288.
5, 6. 'Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 44; p.42,347.
7. 'Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 44; p.42,408.
8, 9. 'Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 44; p.42,571.
10. 'Times', 16 July 1999: p. 12.
11, 12. 'Guardian', 16 July 1999; p. 7.
13. 'Times', 16 July 1999; p. 12.
14. 'Times', 16 July 1999; p. 1.
15. 'Keesing's Record of World Affairs', Volume 44; p.42,217.
16. 'Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 44; p.42,207.
17. Josef V. Stalin: Interview with Maurice Thorez, 19 November 1944, in:
CEMOPI:'Bulletin International', New Series, No. 11, 1999; p. iii.