List of Chapters
32: A "Superfluity of Capital"

Lenin held that a monopoly capitalist country tended to accumulate a "superfluity of capital":

"An enormous 'superfluity of capital' has accumulated in the advanced countries".
(V.I. Lenin: "Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism", in: "Selected Works", Volume 5; London; 1935; p. 56).
Since the "economic reform", the average rate of profit (that is, the total amount of profit as a percentage of the value of fixed and circulating productive assets) has increased significantly: from 16.7% in 1961-5 to 21.3% in 1966-70.
(N.Y. Drogichinsky: "The Economic Reform in Action", in: "Soviet Economic Reform: Progress and Problems"; Moscow; 1972; p. 208).

If this profit is taken as percentage of the value of fixed productive assets only, the increase is even more striking:



 

YEAR    PROFIT (%)
1965:         30.1%
1966:         35.3%
1967:         39.0%
1968:         40.5%
1969:         43.8%
(N.Y. Drogichinsky: ibid.; p. 204).


The average profit per worker increased as follows:

YEAR            Average Profit per worker
1965:                     1,485 rubles
1966:                     1,773 rubles
1967:                     2,027 rubles
1968:                     2,217 rubles
1969:                     2,549 rubles
(N.Y. Drogichinsky: ibid.; p. 204).


In the period 1971-75 total profit amounted to

".....nearly 500,000 million rubles"

(A.N. Kosygin: "Guidelines for the Development of the National Economy of the USSR for 1976-1980", 25th. Congress CPSU; Moscow; 1976; p. 41)

an increase over the period 1966-70 of ".. 50%.

(A.N. Kosygin: ibid.; p. 41).

By 1972, as has been shown in the section entitled "Investment", the larger enterprises were self-financing. Many, indeed, had accumulated a surplus of funds over and above this, from which they were "...entitled to offer loans to Gosbank for a certain interest fixed by the government".
(E. Manevich: "Ways of Improving the Utilisation of Manpower", in: "Voprosy ekonomiki" (Problems of Economics), No. 12, 1973, in: "Problems of Economics", Volume 17, No. 2; June 1974; p. 11).
Clearly, the contemporary Soviet Union has, in line with Lenins's analysis, accumulated a "superfluity of capital".


33: The Exploitation of the Working Class

As has been said, since the "economic reform" the management personnel of Soviet industry constitute, in Marxist-Leninist terms, a new capitalist class, in that they have effective ownership of the principal means of production.

But, according to Marxism-Leninism, a capitalist class is an exploiting class, a class which exploits the working class.

The question remains: does the Soviet capitalist class exploit the working class? Does it live, partly or wholly, on the labour of the working class?

Contemporary Soviet economists and politicians strongly deny this:

"Socialist society (meaning contemporary Soviet society -- WBB).... has no exploiting classes... whose income is derived from appropriating the results of labour by the exploited classes".
(K.N. Plotnikov: Introduction to "The Soviet Planned Economy"; Moscow; 1974; p. 9).
They maintain that the principle continues to operate "...which determines the distribution of income according to the quantity and quality of work done".
(Y.L. Manevich: "Wages Systems", in: ibid.; p. 229).
although it is admitted that this principle "...operates.. with many deviations".
(Y.L. Manevich: ibid.; p. 229)
But, (as has been shown in Section 18: "The Distribution of Socialist Profit") "deviations" involve the receipt by managerial personnel in Soviet industry of bonuses which are up to 100 times those received by shop floor workers. Such huge differentials can, by not stretch of the imagination, be reconciled with the principle of "the distribution of income according to quantity and quality of work done". They represent, in Marxist-Leninist terminology, the exploitation of the working class.

A significant feature of this exploitation in the Soviet Union, as compared with that which according to Marxism-Leninism, occurs in orthodox capitalist countries, is the greater extent to which high political personnel participate in it. This is illustrated by some extracts from a biography of Leonid Brezhnev, who holds the post of General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (and now also that of Head of state):

"If anything distinguished Brezhnev from the coterie of baggy-suited apparatchiki around Khrushchev, it was his sartorial trimness. Foy D. Kohler, a former US ambassador to the Soviet Union, used to say that Brezhnev 'must have the best tailor in Moscow'...

Publicly he is a moraliser who exhorts people to ever greater achievements with finger-wagging monotony and orthodox Communist cliches. Behind the scenes he loves the good life; expensive clothes; gadgets; fast and ostentatious cars; thoroughbred horses; stiff drinks; spicy foods...; beautiful girls; loge seats at Moscow's Dynamo or Lenin stadiums where he can watch his favourite soccer team; boar hunting; duck shooting and yachting -- in other words, the perquisites of belonging to the upper classes of Soviet society. While I was in Moscow other members of the Politburo rode in Soviet-made ZILs and Chaikas, but Brezhnev flashed about in his Rols-Royce. Subsequently he was seen in a Cadillac which Nixon gave him in 1972 and presumably he now drives about in the Lincoln Continental he got from the President in 1973 of the steel-blue Mercedes 450-SCL he received from Willy Brandt.

He is also vain. He preens himself before any mirror he passes, combing and smoothing down his wavy hair, brushing any dust or lint from the lapels of his expensive suits. He has the facial lines erased from his official portraits...

But no matter how charming he tries to be, his eyes often betray him... When he is not consciously attempting to impress, they are hard and icy..

He is conservative, prudent and cautious...

He is a manipulator of men and skilled at tuning the party instrument so that it hums to his score...

He behaves like a 'chairman of the board', albeit a chairman whose power is virtually unlimited..

Today his team in Moscow is appropriately called the Dnieper Mafia. It is a clique of powerful politicians, apparatchiki, aides, advisers and friends who started in politics, government and industry with and under Brezhnev in Dneprodzerzhinsk, Dnepropetrovsk and Zaporozhe in the 1930s and 1940s.

Today these men... assure him his working majority in the Politburo, give him his strength in the Central Committee, fill key positions on his personal staff, influence his views and policies, serve as his watchdogs in government administration, control the police, the KGB and party apparatus. It is a formidable list of the most important men in the Soviet Union....

Even more imporant, perhaps, than the Dnieper Mafia is Brezhnev's solid power base in the Soviet military establishment....

His signature next to Nixon's on the strategic arms limitation (SALT) treaty set a precedent in international law; it was the first time that an agreement between two nations had been signed by one man in his capacity as party leader...

In reality, Brezhnev's signature on the treaty merely underlines what has become apparent in recent years. He is the new tsar of the Kremlin, title or no title.

This build-up began in early 1970. In March of that year, unaccompanied by other Politburo members or senior government officials except for Defence Minister Grechko, Brezhnev journeyed to Minsk to review the Soviet Army's spring manoevres, an act that cast him in the role of supreme commander.

In June he set a noteworthy precedent by attending a meeting of the Council of Ministers, of which he is not even a member but whose chairman is Kosygin, and delivered what 'Pravda' called a 'major speech'...

In February 1971, when the draft of the current five-year plan was published, the Central Committee decree approving it was signed by Brezhnev alone...

The most persuasive evidence of Brezhnev's real power was provided by the 24th. Party Congress in April 1971. He spoke for six hours.... and every minute of it was telecast to the nation....

At the very moment Kosygin began to speak in the Kremlin's cavernous Palace of Congresses, Soviet television started re-broadcasting Brezhnev's report in its entirety...

At the 24th. Congress he was eulogised and panegyrised by a succession of delegates who lauded his 'tireless activity and constant concern for the welfare of the people' and proclaimed that his six-hour speech had brought 'tears of joy and pride' to their eyes...

At first sight the Soviet political system strikes most observers as an alien, unfathomable labyrinth that defies comparison with anything in the West. In many ways it is, but there is one possible analogy: New York's Tammanny Hall.

At its height, Tammanny represented... a system of political conrol centring around a single powerful figure -- the boss -- and a complex organisation of lesser figures -- the machine --.. To obtain some idea of the Soviet system one should imagine a 'super Tammany' with political monopoly exercising virtually unchallenged control of the press, the police, the economy, the military, the judiciary, even the cultural establishment.

Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev is the Soviet 'boss' today. He got where he is through patronage, intrigue, manipulation, maneuvering and political influence peddling...

The heart of his political machine is the Dnieper mafia...

Brezhnev's political machine is undoubtedly a precision instrument....

Llleonid Ilyich Brezhnev... is omnipresent. His portrait is on every wall of nearly every government and party office from Brest-Litovsk to Vladivostock. It is held aloft, icon like, by thousands of marchers each 1 May and 7 November. It hangs in super-dimensional form from the facades of public buildings on important state occasions and holidays. His name appears in 'Pravda', 'Izvestia' and countless other Soviet newspapers every day. It is mentioned on radio and television several times daily. It appears in headlines and has become a household name around the globe. His speeches are mandatory reading for millions. His books stand on the shelves of all libraries in the USSR....

For half of their married life they (the Brezhnevs -- WBB) have lived in the same apartment house -- reserved for high-ranking party functionaries. By Moscow standards it is a posh neighborhood...

It would be an idyllic picture of upper-middle-class Soviet life were it not marred by the problems of so many upper-middle-class apparatchik families: the un-Soviet like airs of the children.

Next to affairs of State and Party, Galina (Brezhnev's daughter -- WBB) has been Brezhnev's greatest problem. Her penchant for men from the circus and her romantic escapades were the primary reason why her daughter Viktoria lived not with her but with Brezhnev... Motherhood is not her thing. By comparison, her brother Yuri, 40, is a paragon of good behaviour... On a recent trip to Paris, in January 1972, he made news of his own by going to the Crazy Horse Saloon, the French capital's best-known and most expensive strip-tease club and allegedly paying the head waiter a $100 tip...

Leonid Brezhnev has been a member of the elite since 1931, and he is now at its apex. Government dachas and limousines for his private use, servants, Black Sea vacation villas and, above all, the right to buy in special Central Committee and Kremlin stores where premium Soviet-made and the finest imported merchandise is available at cost and below -- these have been his privileges for nearly two decades. He takes them for granted. Though he also denies them...

If Brezhnev even has a salary, then it is probably not more than 1,000 rubles ($1,350) per month -- less than what he was earning as a lieutenant-general -- which is approximately eight times the average monthly wage (122 rubles) of a skilled industrial or white collar worker. But salary is not the issue, for like all other members of the Politburo and the Secretariat, Brezhnev is entitled to an 'open account' at the State Bank from which he may draw and spend as much as he wishes, for anything he pleases.

Naturally, he has a flat-roofed, California style bungalow with fire place, swimming-pool and patio in the Politburo compound at Kolchuga, a village 18 miles west of the centre of Moscow. A restricted area, it is surrounded, like most of the dachas of the elite, by a ten-foot-high wooden fence and a small army of grim-looking uniformed police and security men who guard the access roads... By Soviet standards it is opulent. So incidentally is Breshnev's Kutovoski Avenue apartment...

His fleet of automobiles is legendary, but in addition to those he has a whole park of Kremlin and Central Committee limousines, including foreign-made ones, from which to choose. And what was it he told Willy Brand? Oh yes, he has another, bigger yacht than the one in which they cruised off Oreanda....

A Kremlin physician measures the water temperature before Brezhnev takes a dip in the Black Sea...

The fact is that Communism in the Soviet Union has given birth to a new upper class which enjoys and guards its privileges just a jealously as the old one. It is very much a hierarchical system in which each step up the ladder brings with it greater and additional perquisites...

He (Brezhnev -- WBB) is neither an intellectual nor culturally inclined...

He likes technical things. The intricate push-button and telephone panel sunk into the top of his Kremlin office desk, heatable swimming pools, automatically operated sliding doors -- those are the things he shows visitors with pride....

The sport about which he is most enthusiastic.. is hunting. He claims to have shot everything from hares around Moscow to bears in Kazakhstan. His favourtie area is a Savidovo... There the Politburo maintains a private 140-square mile game preserve with hunting lodges... Brezhnev also claims to be a conservationist.

Leonid Brezhnev is a conservative".
(J. Dornberg: "Brezhnev: The Masks of Power"; London; 1974; p. 15, 18-19, 20, 21, 23, 24, 31-2, 274, 275, 283, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 294).

The unique feature of open (i.e., unlimited) bank accounts for the higher echelons of Soviet managerial personnel (to which Dornberg refers in the above-quoted passage), although not officially admitted, has been confirmed by other investigators: "Nachalniks (i.e., administrative personnel -- WBB).. are put on what is called an 'open bank account', which means that all their needs and those of their immediate family are freely supplied... by the state".
(Z. Katz: "Patterns of Social Stratification in the USSR"; Cambridge (USA); 1972; p. 82).
 

34: The Market Problem

Engels held that, by reason of the anarchic character of production in a capitalist society and the fact that, in such a society, the workers receive in wages the money equivalent of only a part of the value they produce, every capitalist society experiences a market problem:

"The extension of the markets (in capitalist society -- WBB) cannot keep pace with the extension of production".
(F. Engels: "Herr Eugen Duhrung's Revolution in Science"; Moscow; 1959; p. 379).

"While the productive power (in a capitalist society - WBB) increases in a geometric, the extension of markets proceeds at best in an arithmetic ratio".
(F. Engels: Preface to the English Edition of: K. Marx: "Capital", Volume 1; London; 1974; p. 16, 17).

Contemporary Soviet economists admit that the Soviet economy is now experiencing such a market problem: "The market problem exists not only for consumer goods but also for the means of production".
("Pravda" (Truth). June 23rd., 1965, cied in: J.L. Felker: "Soviet Economic Controversies"; Cambridge (USA); 1966; p. 92).
One attempt to alleviate this market problem has been the great extension of credit sales: "The sale of goods on a deferred-payment basis.... exerts a considerable positive impact on the expansion of production and sale of consumer goods...

Credit sales to the public... are acquiring more and more significance for the development of retail trade in our country....

In the total retail trade of non-food commodities, the share of goods sold on an instalment basis is increasing: from 1.8% in 1960 to 5.7% in 1967".
(V. Ilin & B. Koriagin: "The Sale of Goods to the Public on Credit", in: "Nauchnye vysshei doklady shkoly: Ekonomicheskie nauki" (Scientific Reports of Higher Schools: Economic Science), No. 7, 1969, in: "Problmes of Economics", Volume 12, No. 8; December 1969; p. 68, 69).

Naturally, interest charges are paid on the credit granted, although at present these are not high -- 1% over 6 months, 2% over 12 months.(V. Ilin & B. Koriagin: ibid.; p. 72).

Since it is necessary for these economists to present the Soviet economy as "socialist", they are, therefore, compelled to put forward the view that the market problem, the need to seek foreign markets, is one which is common to both capitalist and socialist economies:

"A situation always emerges when the production of some article... exceeds the purchasing power or the physiological and spiritual requirements of the population of the nation, no matter how large it is...

The development of production evolves the need for the export of output....

The need for exports always arises in both Department (that producing means of production and that producing consumer goods -- WBB) when the volume of production exceeds the limits of the country's requirements. The quicker production outstrips the population growth, the greater becomes the need for sales on foreign markets...

The growth of production leads to the greater requirement for foreign markets".
(M. Senin: "Socialist Integration"; Moscow; 1973; p. 108, 117, 119).

In 1967 the export quota (i.e., the volume of exports expressed as a percentage of national income) of the Soviet Union was 3.9% (M. Senin: ibid.; p. 87).

Contemporary Soviet economists and politicians emphasise that this export quota must be increased, by greater concentration on production for export:

"Soviet scientific and economic thought... increasingly focuses attention on the idea of concentrating export production , of assigning it a special place in the economy".
( M. Senin: ibid.; p. 136).

"We intend to expand the country's export potential systematically....
Since foreign trade has become a major branch of the national economy the problem arises of setting up a number of export-oriented industries to meet the specific requirements of foreign markets"
(A.N. Kosygin: "Guidelines for the Development of the National Economy of the USSR for 1976-1980", 25th. Congress CPSU; Moscow; 1976; p. 45).

But the Soviet Union, they say, has a specific problem also in "...its export pattern, a problem specific to the USSR. The latter has emerged because at present raw and other materials, fuel and foodstuffs (export items of little effectiveness) account for a large share of the Soviet exports".
(M. Senin: ibid.; p. 136).
In fact, in 1967 fuel, raw and other materials, and foodstuffs constituted 62.5% of Soviet exports.
(M. Senin: ibid.; p. 99).

The low "effectiveness" of these items is to be found in the fact that their production for export is significantly less profitable than that of manufactured goods:

"The problem of the burdensome-ness of the export of raw materials... emerged because in the export field the operation of the extractive industry is less profitable than that of the manufacturing industry.. The difference is due to the fact that manufacture is far ahead of extraction as regard the effectiveness of investments.... An exporter is in a less favourable position.. because he does not primarily export products of the manufacturing industry".
(M. Senin: ibid.; p. 242-3, 247).
Naturally, therefore, contemporary Soviet economists urge that steps be taken to change the pattern of Soviet exports in the direction of manufactured goods: "The problem of burdensome-ness caused by the relatively low effectiveness of the export of products of the extractive industry and agriculture is inevitably alleviated as the ratio between products of the extractive industry and products of the manufacturing industry changes in favour of the latter".
(M. Senin: ibid.; p. 247).

"The high growth rates in engineering and other manufacturing industries and measures to raise the technical level and product quality create prerequisites for increasing the share of the manufacturing industries' produce in Soviet exports".
("Soviet Economy Forges Ahead: Ninth Five-Year Plan: 1971-1975"; Moscow; 1973; p. 100).

The market problem has, of course, important effects on Soviet foreign policy, but space does not permit treatment of this question here.

Next Chapter: Chapters 35- end: The Class Structure of Contemporary Soviet Society

Previous Chapter: Chapters 30-31: The Concentration and Centralisation of Capital.

For other works by Bill Bland see the CL site.